Know your Neighbor: The Impact of Social Context on Fairness Behavior by Sircar, Neelanjan et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Know your neighbor: The impact of social
context on fairness behavior
Neelanjan Sircar1☯, Ty Turley2☯, Peter van der Windt3☯*, Maarten Voors4☯
1 Center for Policy Research, New Delhi, India, 2 Marriott School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah,
United States of America, 3 Social Science Division, New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, 4 Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* petervanderwindt@nyu.edu
Abstract
Laboratory experiments offer an opportunity to isolate human behaviors with a level of preci-
sion that is often difficult to obtain using other (survey-based) methods. Yet, experimental
tasks are often stripped of any social context, implying that inferences may not directly map
to real world contexts. We randomly allocate 632 individuals (grouped randomly into 316
dyads) from small villages in Sierra Leone to four versions of the ultimatum game. In addition
to the classic ultimatum game, where both the sender and receiver are anonymous, we
reveal the identity of the sender, the receiver or both. This design allows us to explore how
fairness behavior is affected by social context in a natural setting where players are drawn
from populations that are well-acquainted. We find that average offers increase when the
receiver’s identity is revealed, suggesting that anonymous ultimatum games underestimate
expected fair offers. This study suggest that researchers wishing to relate laboratory behav-
ior to contexts in which the participants are well-acquainted should consider revealing the
identities of the players during game play.
Introduction
Behavioral games have become popular tools to make inferences about hard-to-measure
preferences. Workhorse games include dictator games to understand altruistic preferences,
ultimatum games to measure preferences for fairness, and public goods games to learn about
cooperative behavior. These sorts of inferences cannot be easily discerned from standard sur-
vey or secondary data sources. However, the use of experiments remains controversial because
participants are typically studied in isolation of their social context. As such, critics argue that
behavioral games are artificial and the resulting inferences necessarily flawed. In this paper, we
explore how laboratory behavior may be impacted by incorporating contextual information
among populations where individuals are well-acquainted with each other.
Behavior in laboratory games departs from standard human interaction in a number of key
ways. Typically, participants do not have direct interaction with their counterparts, and are
often unacquainted with each other. In addition, during game play the identities of the partici-
pants are not revealed. The original protocol for the dictator game, for example, entailed
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informing the dictator that the receiver was behind a closed door to ensure anonymity [1]. In
such a setting, no attributes of the receiver, such as personal characteristics or information
obtained from previous interactions, can affect the decision of the dictator. Most interactions
in daily life, however, occur between individuals that are well-acquainted. Factors such as
knowledge of a counterpart’s personal characteristics, previous and possible future interac-
tions, and the social networks in which the individuals are embedded—i.e. the “social con-
text”—are often key drivers of individual behavior [2].
In this paper, we investigate the role of social context in the ultimatum game. In particular,
we randomly allocate 632 individuals (grouped randomly into 316 dyads) from small villages
in Sierra Leone to four versions of the ultimatum game. The first version is the classic version
of the ultimatum game, where both the sender and the receiver are anonymous. That is, their
identities are not revealed to each other. In addition, we randomize sender-receiver dyads to
conditions where 1) the identity of the receiver is revealed to the sender but the sender is
unknown to the receiver; 2) the identity of the sender is revealed to the receiver but the
receiver is unknown to the sender; and 3) both the identities of the sender and the receiver are
revealed to each other. This design allows us to explore the causal impact of varying the extent
to which social context matters for experimental contributions.
In rural Sierra Leone, like in many rural communities around the world, economic
and social interactions occur within local, dense social networks, among populations with
individuals that know each other well [3]. This implies that real-life interactions between study
participants are unlikely to be driven by abstract notions of fairness, but rather by deeply con-
textualized understandings of fairness that are embedded in daily village life and formed by
day-to-day bargaining between villagers over food, land, and risk. Furthermore, studying
norms of fairness is particularly important in the Sierra Leone context, where grievances from
unfair behavior by rural elites have been suggested as a major contributing factor to the 1991-
2002 civil war [4, 5].
We find that in versions of the ultimatum game in which the receiver’s identity is revealed,
the average offer increases. This suggests that anonymous ultimatum games underestimate
expected fair offers and is consistent with other social behaviors, such as altruism [6] and trust
[7].
This study addresses a key question concerning the use of classic experimental protocols to
study human behavior. Many behavioral games abstract from the social context of human
behavior to estimate underlying preferences. As a result, inferences drawn from these games
are unlikely to translate directly to situations where participants know each other. In real life,
an individual’s behavior is very different depending on the counterpart with whom interaction
takes place, whether these counterparts are fellow villagers in Sierra Leone or friends and col-
leagues in New York City. Our study therefore explores an important link between nuanced
information from the laboratory and the real world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section reviews the literature
on the role of social context in ultimatum games. We then introduce our sample of partici-
pants in Sierra Leone, the experimental game variations and empirical strategy. We next pres-
ent the results and close with a discussion.
Ultimatum games and social context
Measuring social preferences using laboratory-style experiments broadly encompasses investi-
gations into trust, reciprocity, fairness, altruism and the propensity for cooperation [8]. The
workhorse experiment to understand fairness behavior is the ultimatum game, first studied in
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[9] (see [10] for a detailed explication). In the ultimatum game, the “sender” splits a fixed sum
of money between herself and the “receiver”. The receiver subsequently decides to accept or
reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both players receive the proposed allocation. If rejected,
both players receive nothing. In the classic version of this game, the sender and the receiver
are not given any information about each other and are often unacquainted with each other
outside the game. If both the sender and receiver were only materially self-interested, one
would expect offers in the ultimatum game to be nearly zero and such offers to be accepted by
the receiver. Empirically, however, one finds that senders usually offer 25-50% of the endow-
ment, and offers less than 20% are typically rejected by the receiver [8]. This behavior is often
taken as evidence that players are not purely materially self-interested and that the receiver
may “punish” the sender for a proposed offer that is deemed to be unfair.
The role of social context
There are compelling reasons why behavioral games use anonymity and/or play with subjects
that are unacquainted with each other. It allows researchers to isolate underlying behavioral
preferences without contamination by social considerations. However, for many such stud-
ies, the real-world behaviors they are designed to measure, such as altruism, trust and fair-
ness, are inextricably linked to, or embedded in, a social context. Abstracting from the social
context implies ignoring a large part of what drives behavior. Indeed, Levitt et al. [2] highlight
that real-life behavior is influenced by not only monetary calculations but also by several
other factors including: (i) the stakes of the game; (ii) the presence of moral and ethical con-
siderations; (iii) the extent to which one’s actions are scrutinized by others and the nature of
such scrutiny; (iv) the subject pool of respondents; and (v) the context in which the decision
is embedded.
One common approach to introduce some social context is the “attribute-based” behavioral
game. In such a laboratory game, certain attributes of another player, like ethnicity or gender,
are revealed but the rest of the interaction is either anonymized or the participants are other-
wise unacquainted with each other. The intuitive empirical interpretation of such studies is
that it measures the extent of the behavior between random strangers who can only discern the
attribute under question. It is natural to use this type of game to characterize “statistical dis-
crimination,” the extent to which all beliefs that can be gleaned from an attribute predicts dif-
ferences in outcomes. These ideas have been applied to, for instance, the housing or labor
market, where employers and landlords must sort through large numbers of applicants with
minimal information. Such studies, however, provide little empirical leverage on contexts
where individuals regularly interact and have a large amount of contextual information. Fur-
thermore, observed differences in laboratory behavior may not be due to some experimentally
manipulated revelation of a single attribute but rather a function of more complex interactions
that were not manipulated by the experimenter [11].
This study takes these arguments to their logical ends. Because the social behaviors we seek
to measure—fairness among individuals that know each other—are likely a function of com-
plex interactions between individuals, we do not manipulate a single attribute. Rather, we
manipulate whether the sender and/or receiver are revealed to each other in the game. This
paper thus estimates the impact of including various levels of contextual information in an
ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is typically used to deduce abstract principles of fair-
ness, where these principles emanate from what the receiver deems to be a “fair” allocation.
Our contribution is to understand how these principles of fairness change as a function of
information about the social context.
Know your neighbor
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Related studies
In S1 Supporting Information we present an overview of the fifteen most cited ultimatum
game studies. These studies show that behaviors related to fairness depend on many factors,
such as player characteristics (e.g. gender) and the context of interactions, like the stakes
involved in the game [12]. In thirteen of the fifteen studies, both the sender and receiver play
anonymously, and the games are typically conducted between university students. Notable
exceptions are Solnick et al. [13] and Charness et al. [14]. The first study reveals the identity of
the receiver and the sender through a photograph to learn about the influence of physical
attractiveness on the bargaining process. However, the researchers explicitly recruit two non-
overlapping samples from different universities to ensure that players are unacquainted with
each other. In Charness et al. [14], participants are given the family name of their counterparts,
but the authors are careful to note, “Participants from two different universities are used to
ensure that this is the only additional information they receive (that is, they do not know their
counterparts personally)” (page 30). By keeping the sender and/or receiver anonymous, or by
revealing identities of unacquainted individuals, factors such as knowledge of a counterpart’s
personal characteristics, previous interactions, beliefs about future relations, and the social net-
works in which they are embedded are precluded from driving a player’s behavior.
Table 1 presents ten recent papers that use ultimatum, dictator or trust games to investigate
the effects of varying the anonymity of players. Both Burnham [15] and Bohnet et al. [16] con-
duct a set of dictator games where the identities of the senders and receivers are revealed to
each other. In the first study, the identities were revealed through a photograph, and in the sec-
ond study subjects were asked to stand up and look at each other in silence before they made
their decision anonymously. In both studies, the subjects were students unacquainted with
each other outside of the game. Bohnet et al., for example, explicitly notes, “The subjects were
recruited during their second week at the university. Therefore most students did not know
each other before the experiment (page 47 in [16]).”
In contrast, Binzel et al. [7] and Dufwenberg et al. [17] conduct, respectively, a set of trust
and dictator games in which the participants are well-acquainted with each other. However,
both of these studies reveal only one of the players; in the first study, only the receiver is
revealed, and in the second study, only the sender is revealed. Brañas-Garza et al. [18] [19],
Table 1. Experimental studies that vary anonymity.
Study Type Location Sender Receiver Sample Participants
This study UG LF R R K Rural villagers in Sierra Leone
Burnham [15] DG L R R U Subjects at University of Arizona
Bohnet et al. [16] DG L R R U Students at University of Zurich
Binzel et al. [7] TG LF A R K Members housing areas in Cairo
Dufwenberg et al. [17] DG L R A K Students at Stockholm University
Brañas-Garza et al. [18] DG L A R K Students at University of Granada
Brañas-Garza et al. [19] DG L A R K Students at University of Granada
Cobo-Reyes et al. [20] CG L A R K Students at University of Granada
Kovářı́k et al. [21] DG L A R K Students at University of Granada
Leider et al. [22] DG LF R R K Students at Harvard University
Ligon et al. [23] DG LF R R K Rural villagers in Paraguay
 Under ‘Type’, “UG”, “TG”, “DG” and “CG” indicate ultimatum, trust, dictator and coordination games, respectively. In column ‘Location’, “L” indicates laboratory
games, whereas “LF” are lab-in-the-field experiments. In columns ‘Sender’ and ‘Receiver’, “A” (“R”) indicates whether the player is anonymous or revealed. Finally, the
column ‘Sample’ indicates if the subjects are known to each other (“K”), or not (“U”).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194037.t001
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Cobo-Reyes et al. [20] and Kovářı́k et al. [21] also conduct games with well-acquainted partici-
pants. As part of the design, participants were asked to list their close friends. Senders knew
that the receiver would be a friend drawn randomly from their own list. In all four studies, the
aim was anonymity of the receiver’s identity, except for their friendship status. Brañas-Garza
et al., for example, explicitly note, “Although [senders] know whether the recipient is a friend
or not, they ignore the identity, so between-subjects anonymity is preserved.” (page 173 in
[19]). Only in the rare instances where senders listed solely one friend, did the sender know
the identity of the receiver.
Closest to our study are Leider et al. [22] and Ligon et al. [23]. The first conducted online
dictator games among Harvard University undergraduates from the same dormitory and
decomposes the motivation for sharing into: (i) altruism towards a randomly selected stranger;
(ii) altruism towards a friend; and (iii) altruism motivated by the prospect of future interaction
(by revealing the sender). Ligon et al. [23] conducted a set of dictator games with households
in fifteen villages in rural Paraguay. Dictators were asked to play four games that varied
whether the dictator was anonymous or revealed, and whether the recipient was randomly
selected and remained anonymous or was purposefully selected by the dictator and thus
revealed to the dictator. In this paper, we depart from these two studies in two important ways.
First, we relax anonymity in a setting where players are well-acquainted with each other, and
the sender cannot choose the receiver. In our setup, senders and receivers are randomly
matched, and each of the dyads are randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups. We
therefore measure behavior between pairs of individuals that can be compared to the classical
game, since the composition of dyads is not affected by selection due to random assignment.
Furthermore, we can isolate the causal effect of introducing a common social context on labo-
ratory behavior by revealing identity between individuals well-acquainted with each other.
Second, this paper assesses the impact of relaxing anonymity on behavior in the ultimatum
game. While Leider et al. [22] and Ligon et al. [23] have investigated the impact of relaxing
anonymity on altruism and trust, there is less understanding of its impact on norms of
fairness.
Material and methods
We conducted a set of laboratory experiments in 35 small and remote communities in rural
Sierra Leone in 2010. These communities lie close to the Gola Rainforest National Park in
Eastern Sierra Leone. Our research villages are small with an average population size of about
220 individuals divided over an average of 28 houses, implying that economic and social inter-
actions between villagers is frequent. These numbers are in line with successive national cen-
suses (1963, 1984, 2004). The reach of the government is limited, and formal, legal and
political institutions are less important than the local institutions and social structures. Local
elites, often appointed for life, have great authority to organize economic and social activity,
including the power to raise taxes, mobilize labor, settle disputes and allocate resources such as
land, labor and reproductive opportunities [5, 24, 25]. Community-level activities such as the
organization of public goods projects, dispute settlement and collaborative efforts are governed
by local institutions and social norms of cooperation [3, 26, 27]. Behavior and social exchange
and interactions are governed by a deeply entrenched patronage relationship of interrelated
gifts and obligations [28]. For example, Bulte et al. [29] show the importance of social context
for trading behavior in Sierra Leone. In sum, we expect fairness behavior by individuals in
rural Sierra Leone to be driven not only by individual preferences, but to a large extent by the
social context. This characterization of the dense social networks of rural communities is not
unique to Sierra Leone and is reflected in writings on gift exchange [30–32].
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Furthermore, a careful understanding of norms of fairness is important in Sierra Leone.
The society is governed by patron-client relationships, where villagers depend on a highly
exclusionary set of traditional institutions if they want access to property or political rights.
The system has historically created a large class of excluded, low status individuals (mostly
migrants and young men). Some scholars of Sierra Leone argue that forced community labor,
harsh fines imposed by chiefs, and lack of employment opportunities (all products of this sys-
tem) created feelings of disenfranchisement and resentment among rural youth, which in turn
was a major contributing factor to the 1991-2002 civil war [4, 33, 34]. For example, Hum-
phreys et al. [35] show that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) found significant popular
support from students and farmers upset with the recurring marginalization and humiliation.
There is evidence that grievances as a result of this unfair treatment by rural elite have persisted
in the post-war period [5]. Note, however, that Voors et al. [36] find little evidence that griev-
ances explain the onset or duration of violence during the civil war in Sierra Leone.
A total of 632 heads of household participated in our ultimatum games. Specifically, we
grouped the participants into 316 randomly created dyads. We then randomly assigned each
individual in the dyad to the role of sender or receiver. The senders were endowed with 5,000
Le (around 1.1 USD, about a day’s wage) and asked to offer a portion of their endowment to
the receiver. The receiver could then accept or reject the offer. If accepted, the sender and
receiver kept the division proposed by the sender; otherwise both received nothing. To test the
effect of introducing social considerations to the ultimatum game we randomly allocated the
dyads in the village to one of four versions: (i) both the sender and the receiver played anony-
mously (which we denote as AA); (ii) the identity of the receiver was revealed to the sender
(AR), (iii) the sender was identified to the receiver, and the sender made her decision knowing
that the receiver would know her name (RA), and (iv) the names of both the receiver and the
sender were revealed to each other (RR). The script that was given to players after discussing
the rules of the ultimatum game can be found in S1 Supporting Information. We note that
when the sender, receiver or both are revealed, the sender and receiver may potentially interact
and future economic interactions may be shaped by game play, capturing a realistic aspect of
dyadic interactions not included in anonymized games.
Ethics statement
We obtained verbal informed consent from the respondents because in rural Sierra Leone very
few people can read or write. Research assistants went through an explanation of the research
and asked respondents whether they understood and agreed to go ahead. Respondents were
informed that they were not obliged to answer questions if they did not want to and were free
to stop the interview at all times. The research assistant recorded the answer of the respondent
and any remarks made on the survey form. We obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval for this study and related protocols from the IRB of Njala University in Sierra Leone
(#FWA00018924), and from the IRB of the University of Chicago (#H10076) where Ty Turley
was affiliated during the whole period of data collection.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is straightforward. We compare the average levels of the offers across
the four conditions. To make causal claims, our analysis relies on complete randomization of
participants to experimental conditions within each village. This guarantees that the average
characteristics of the study participants for each of the four conditions are similar in expecta-
tion [37]. In S1 Supporting Information we compare a number of key characteristics across
the four conditions. Our players are on average 44 years old, predominantly male, Muslim,
Know your neighbor
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and ethnically Mende. Mean family size is six, and half of the sample is from chiefly families
(families that can stand for the chieftaincy). We find that while some differences are signifi-
cant, there are no strong systematic differences across these four conditions, which we would
expect as a result of our randomization strategy.
Results
We start by looking at descriptive statistics about offers in the ultimatum game. Close to all
senders made a positive offer, with only three subjects offering zero. In total, only eight offers
were rejected (the average offer in that case was 1,438 Le), suggesting that senders were largely
successful in internalizing how little the receiver would be willing to accept before rejecting the
offer. The distribution across treatment arms is as follows: AA:1, AR:0, RA:2, RR:5. In a set of
ultimatum games conducted among non-integrated Spanish gypsies, Brañas-Garza et al. [38]
find that receivers often accepted zero offers for reasons of solidarity. As we have discussed
above, fairness is an important driver of behavior in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, because few
offers were rejected in our study we cannot explore the behavior of receivers further. The aver-
age offer is 37% of the endowment, or 1,840 Le.
Focusing on our treatment variations, Fig 1 presents the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of contributions across the four conditions. Data is based on a total of 314 senders:
Fig 1. CDF of offers by experimental condition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194037.g001
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129 (AA), 60 (AR), 63 (RA) and 62 (RR). Two observations missed information on offer size
for a total of 314 dyads in our reported sample. There is more variance in offers in the RR con-
dition, as compared to the others. The RR condition has the highest proportion contributions
of 2,000 Le or less and the longest tail (i.e. while the other treatment arms have maximum val-
ues of 3,000 Le, the largest contribution in RR is 5,000 Le).
Table 2 presents the main results. We report standard errors in parentheses. The fully anon-
ymous treatment (AA) is set as the baseline category. P-values for across treatment arm com-
parisons (AR vs. RA; AR vs. RR; and RA vs. RR) are included. We present results for three
increasingly more demanding model specifications. In Column (1) we cluster the error at the
village level, taking into account that our data is clustered by village. In Column (2) we control
for village level fixed effects, our level of randomization. In Column (3) we control for village
level fixed effects and individual characteristics (the same as used for our balance tests (see S1
Supporting Information). When including control variables, the number of observations
decreases to 298 due to missing data. Specifically, for Column (3) we estimate:
Yi ¼ b1ARi þ b2RAi þ b3RRi þ gIi þ av þ i; ð1Þ
where Yi is the offer by sender i. AR, RA and RR are dummy variables and equal to one if
sender i’s dyad received the respective treatment, and zero otherwise. Ii is a vector of individual
characteristics, αv are village level fixed effects and i is a normally distributed error term. Data
is publicly available and the code used to run the regressions can be found online.
The results are very similar across model specifications. Column (3), our preferred specifi-
cation, shows that when moving from the fully anonymous condition (AA) to revealing the
receiver (AR), mean allocations increase from 1795 Le to 2065 Le (an increase of 15%). Moving
from the RA to AR condition statistically increases the mean allocations also (p = 0.03).
Table 2. Mean offers by experimental condition.
Mean Offer
(1) (2) (2)
AR 188.760 269.505 270.170
(92.160) (116.856) (119.185)
RA -72.351 -0.130 4.489
(101.690) (114.976) (117.816)
RR 103.813 172.799 167.957
(140.931) (115.367) (120.615)
Mean offer in AA 1794.57 1794.57 1794.57
Observations 314 314 298
R2 0.0185 0.1870 0.2333
Village level clusters Yes No No
Village level fixed effects No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Difference: AR vs. RA 0.0165 0.0213 0.0253
Difference: AR vs. RR 0.4838 0.4060 0.3941
Difference: RA vs. RR 0.1912 0.1336 0.1702
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Moving from the AA and RA conditions to the RR condition increases the mean allocation,
but the differences are not statistically significant (as standard errors increase).
Conclusion
Laboratory games may seem contrived and artificial, and it can be difficult to understand how
they should apply to the real world. Yet, these games offer the ability to isolate certain human
behaviors with a level of precision that is often difficult to do using other methods. In this
study, we conduct a set of laboratory exercise to understand how social context impacts behav-
ior in the ultimatum game in small villages in Sierra Leone; i.e., in populations where people
know each other well. We find that revealing the identity of receivers increases mean offers,
corresponding to findings from laboratory games that measure other social behaviors, like
altruism [6] and trust [7], but it has not hitherto been demonstrated for fairness behavior and
ultimatum games. These studies suggest that revealing the receiver decreases social distance
between sender and receiver, causing senders to increase their offers. In a fairness context,
however, even if the social distance between sender and receiver does not change after reveal-
ing the receiver, average offers may still increase. This is because the observed allocation in an
ultimatum game is presumably a function of what the receiver deems to be fair. Practically,
these results imply that a fully anonymous ultimatum game underestimates the expected fair
offer. A researcher interested in determining the expected fair offer in social contexts where
individuals know each other should, thus, reveal the identity of the receiver. We find no such
importance of revealing the identity of the sender on average contributions, although revealing
sender and receiver identities in tandem may increase the variance in contributions.
Because the set of factors that matter to senders and receivers are likely to be too compli-
cated for researcher manipulation, full social context can only be introduced into laboratory
behavior by revealing identities directly. When the sender and the receiver are not revealed,
players must use heuristics like ethnicity and gender, or whatever information is provided by
the researcher, to determine behavioral response. The resulting behavior is unlikely to extend
to social contexts in which individuals know each other well and behavior does not depend on
such heuristics but are a function of nuanced personal factors which result from previous and
future real-life interactions among the participants.
In short, the classic ultimatum game abstracts away from important drivers of human
behavior such as knowledge of a counterpart’s personal characteristics, previous interactions,
and the social networks in which the individuals are embedded. Understanding the influence
of this social context is of critical importance if we want to generalize lessons from the lab to
real-life settings where individuals know each other well.
Supporting information
S1 Supporting Information. Contains additional information about related studies, the
text used in the experiments, and tests for balance across treatment groups.
(PDF)
S1 File. Code. Contains all necessary code to reproduce results.
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